

10 February 1967

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** Deputy Director of Central Intelligence**SUBJECT:** The Inspector General's Survey on Foreign  
Intelligence Collection Requirements

1. This is a brilliant study for which the authors deserve great credit. With the single exception of the section on the PNIOs (which I will discuss later), I have no significant fault to find with the exposition which the survey provides of the present workings of the requirements process or with the diagnosis of what is wrong with this process. The specific recommendations of the report for the most part involve further examination of certain problem areas. Insofar as these areas extend beyond the Agency and involve the community, it would be helpful if the NIPE Staff could participate or be consulted before final action is taken. Specifically, recommendations 1, 2, 3, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22 and 23 appear to me to fall in this category. The balance of the recommendations involve action which is of exclusive concern to components of the Agency. Any comments which I have to offer on these recommendations are gratuitous as they must obviously be dealt with within the line of command.

2. Three general observations may, however, be worth making.

a. A strong Collection Guidance Staff seems an essential prerequisite to further progress in the direction of greater rationalization of intelligence requirements and resources. All the recent studies which have been undertaken of various segments of the intelligence effort (i.e., the Ad Hoc Study of SIGINT Requirements, the Nolting Report, the Bissell Report, etc.)

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have developed the same theme which is central to the present survey. This is the importance of establishing an effective dialogue between the users of intelligence (i. e., the analytical components of the community, particularly DDI, DD&T and BNE in CIA) on the one hand, and the collectors and processors of intelligence data (NSA, DDP, NRO, etc.). The problem is to familiarize the consumers of the product with the potentialities and peculiarities of the systems that produce the product, and vice versa.

CIA must play a leading part in this process. The management of the community must inevitably turn to CIA, in most cases, for objective guidance as to whether information is really necessary and why. A recent proposal from NSA to expand certain facilities in [REDACTED] 25X1 affirms that some of the traffic which would be intercepted by these facilities would provide "a wealth of intelligence information on developments in [REDACTED] 25X1 But how much do we really need to know about developments in [REDACTED] 25X1 I am not suggesting that CIA can answer this question alone. It should, however, take the lead in finding out.

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The Collection Guidance Staff of DDI was designed to fill the need for an instrumentality to bridge the gap between busy analysts and busy collectors. It seems to me to have worked well under difficult circumstances. Given strong support and full access to the working details of collection systems and programs, I believe that this Staff can go a long ways towards providing the information and analysis necessary to permit and support a realistic and disciplined analysis of the intelligence community's informational needs.

b. As indicated above, I fully agree with the thought that CIA must take the lead and bear the responsibility in the effort to identify and refine our basic needs. 25X1

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


c. I also agree that the DCI is in a strong position to make his own views and the views of the Agency effective. As pointed out in the report, the DCI is Chairman of USIB and chairmen of all USIB committees are directly responsive to his leadership and, incidentally, with one exception, on his payroll. The DCI is also, as the report points out, a member of the Executive Committee of the NRO. His representatives participate actively in the formulation and review of all Defense Department intelligence programs. He has had the active support and encouragement of the Bureau of the Budget, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and the President personally in connection with his role as the coordinator of intelligence activities. This role has been specifically defined as including the responsibility, jointly with the heads of departments concerned, of ensuring the efficiency, as well as the effectiveness, of foreign intelligence programs. An essential element of this role is the responsibility for making a definitive determination of the needs of the Government for intelligence.

3. The only recommendation of the report which gives me any trouble is recommendation 1, which calls for the establishment of an ad hoc committee to review DCIDs Nos. 1/2 and 1/3. This recommendation is based on the portion of the report which deals with comprehensive priority national intelligence objectives and points out the inadequacies in the present PNIO list and in the process through which these so-called priority objectives are established and applied to the intelligence effort. The report says in effect that the PNIOs are too vague and general to serve as useful guidance for intelligence activities; that nobody pays any attention to them; and that they should be sharply reduced. In effect the report proposes that we adopt, as our list of national intelligence priorities, what Sherman Kent refers to as the "sudden death" category of issues or developments which, if undetected, might threaten the very existence of the United States.

4. I think it is unfair to the Cline Committee which established the present PNIOs to suggest that they were unaware of the problem. One trouble with any attempt to establish a basic list of

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
fundamental intelligence objectives is the difficulty of getting any two people to agree on what the list ought to be. The report itself illustrates this problem to some degree by suggesting that over-preoccupation with Communism has distorted intelligence thinking and presumably our attitude towards priorities. This merely suggests the difficulty of achieving agreement as to what really constitutes the most significant threat.

5. What seems to have puzzled the Cline Committee even more is the difficulty of establishing a list of priority objectives which are not subject to the criticism of being either too broad and general or too specific and ephemeral to serve any useful purpose. Early warning is presumably on everybody's list of PNIOs. Probably some billion dollars' worth of intelligence activity is justified, one way or another, by the need for early warning of an impending military attack. Simply saying, or even establishing, that the activity contributes something to "early warning," however, doesn't prove that it is a priority activity. The Soviet missile program is another example. Presumably Soviet missiles constitute a military threat of the first order. To say this, however, is not very helpful guidance in determining which of the many collection systems which produce data on missiles to expand or eliminate.

6. At the other end of the spectrum, the signal from ABM associated engagement radar is probably too narrow, specific and ephemeral a target to warrant inclusion in a list of PNIOs, although it is certainly a priority objective.

7. What the Cline Committee did in the face of this dilemma was to identify a number of broad problems such as missiles, early warning, etc. It then recommended that some committee, staff or other mechanism be established to subject these problems to continuing analysis for the purpose of identifying those elements of the problem which could be resolved with available data; those elements which required additional analysis; and those which justified collection of additional data. If such a mechanism were functioning today, it might determine that we have enough pictures of ABM sites but require

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additional data, procurable from ELINT, concerning the nature of the radar, etc.

8. The fact that no attempt was made to establish such a mechanism three years ago was in some considerable measure my fault. After discussions with various senior officials of the community I concluded that, as of 1964, it would have been difficult -- if not impossible -- to establish a working staff in the community which could perform such a function with any effectiveness. My conclusion at the time was that a staff or committee, charged with that function, was at best likely to develop into a harmless but totally uninfluential paper mill. What I did do at the time was to try to strengthen the charter and composition of the Critical Collection Problems Committee (CCPC) to give USIB at least an improved competence to accomplish a continuing review and analysis of the collection effort in priority areas and effect whatever improvements appeared appropriate, including the allocation of additional resources.

9. It now seems to me at least worthwhile examining the possibility of giving this Committee of USIB the responsibility for a continuing review of priority national intelligence objectives across the board with a view to identifying the specific activities (analytical, research, processing or collection) that appear needed to assure optimum coverage of or insight into the problem.

10. I have already recommended a change in the title of the CCPC to broaden its scope and give it responsibility for all critical intelligence programs. Properly staffed, it seems to me that it could perform a function in connection with the PNIOs comparable to the one described above.

11. In conclusion, I should make it clear that I have no objection to a review of DCID 1/2 and 1/3 by a group under the chairmanship of the DDI. I do not think, however, that, in the absence of some follow-on mechanism, a restatement of PNIOs by itself is likely to achieve very much towards further refinement and sharpening of the intelligence effort.

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